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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Petitioner-Appellant Timothy Williams appeals the District Court's Memorandum Decision, 
Order and Appellate Judgment filed on July 1, 2013. The Memorandum Decision, Order and 
Appellate Judgment was issued after briefing and argument on Appellant's Petition for Judicial 
Review, which petition appealed the Final Order of the Respondent-Cross-Appellant Idaho State 
Board of Real Estate Appraisers (hereinafter the "Board"), dated February 27,2012. The Final Order 
found that Williams committed four (4) violations of the law and rules governing real estate 
appraisers in Idaho. The Final Order accordingly revoked Williams' real estate appraiser license, 
imposed a fine in the amount of $4,000, and ordered Williams to pay the Board's costs and attorney 
fees accrued in the investigation and prosecution of the four violations found by the Board. 
B. Procedural and Factual History. 
Respondent refers to and incorporates by reference the Procedural Background in the District 
Court's Memorandum Decision, Order and Appellate Judgment for the factual and procedural 
history of this case. (R., pp. 565-567.) 
U. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Issue Presented on Cross-Appeal. 
I. The District Court erred in determining that the Board's express authority to recover 
costs and fees was too vague to allow the Board to recover attorney fees it incurred in investigating 
and prosecuting Williams' four violations of its laws. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 1. 
B. Additional Issues Presented on Appeal. 
1. Petitioner improperly raises for the first time on appeal a void for vagueness challenge 
to I.C § 54-4107 (1)( c) and (e) to this Court and, therefore, the issue is precluded from consideration 
on appeal. 
2. Petitioner improperly reasserts challenges to the statutory bases for some of the 
findings against him for violation of I.C § 54-4107 (1 )( d) and (e) because his assertions were raised 
for the first time on appeal to the District Court. 
III. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Board is entitled to an award of its fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C § 12-117. 
The Board is a state agency within the meaning of I.C § 12-117 and is therefore entitled to an award 
of its fees and costs on the basis that Petitioner-Appellant has appealed the findings of the Board in 
its Final Order without a reasonable basis in fact or law in whole or, in the alternative, in part. 
Petitioner has contested the Board's Final Order for reasons that were largely considered and rejected 
by the Hearing Officer, and there is plainly substantial and competent evidence supporting the 
Board's findings in its Final Order. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review on .Iudicial Review. 
Proceedings before the Board and judicial review of the actions of the Board are governed 
by chapter 52, title 67 of the Idaho Code, otherwise known as the Idaho Administrative Procedures 
Act. I.C §§ 54-2305(f), 67-5207. A strong presumption of validity favors an agency's actions. 
Cooperv. Board of Prof I Discipline of the Idaho State Bd. of Medicine , 134 Idaho 449, 454 (2000). 
The agency's action may only be set aside if the agency's findings, conclusions, or decisions 
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(a) violate constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are 
made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 
"""hole; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.e. § 67-5279(3). The petitioner 
bears the burden of showing that the board erred in one of the enumerated manners. Price v. Payette 
Cty. Board ofCty. Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426, 429 (1998). In addition, the court will affirm an 
agency action unless a substantial right of the appellant has been prejudiced. I.e. § 67-5279(4). 
Judicial review is confined to the record. Jefferson County v. Eastern Idaho Reg. Med. Ctr., 
126 Idaho 392, 394 (eL App. 1994) (citing I.e.§§ 67-5277, -5279(1). The court will defer to the 
agency's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous and unsupported by evidence 
in the record. Cooper, 134 Idaho at 454, The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency as to the weight of the evidence on factual matters. Id. Factual determinations by 
administrative agencies should be overturned only upon a showing of a clearly erroneous decision 
or an abuse of discretion. Jefferson County, 126 Idaho at 394 (citing I.e. § 67-5279(3)(d), (3). If 
the order is not affirmed, it shall be set aside in whole or in part and the case remanded. I.e. § 67-
5279(3)(e). 
B. There Was No Violation of Idaho Law in the Complaints Filed Requiring a Dismissal 
of the Charges. 
Williams claims that there was a failure to follow the Idaho statutes governing complaints 
against a licensee in the procedures of this case. Specifically, Williams contends that the 
investigation into Williams' actions were initiated upon unlawful procedure because Williams claims 
there was no written, sworn complaint or formal motion made at a hearing by the Board to begin the 
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investigation as Williams argues was required by I.e. § 54-4107 (1). 1 Yet as he notes in his briefing, 
this issue was raised several times before two separate hearing officers during the pendency of this 
proceeding (see Petitioner's Brief, p. 18), and each time the hearing officer ruled in favor of the 
Board on the matter. More so, Williams raised this same issue twice on judicial review, and twice 
the District Court also ruled in favor of the Board. First the District Court, Judge McKee presiding, 
ruled in favor of the Board, finding no procedural error. See Williams v. State of Idaho Bd. of Real 
Estate Appraisers, Decision and Order on Appeal, CV-OC-0822331, May 21, 2009. Second, the 
District Court, Judge Sticklen presiding, again ruled in favor of the Board on this issue. (See R., pp. 
569-572.) This Court should likewise decline to find for Petitioner on this issue. 
1. Pursuant to its Statutory Authority, the Idaho Board of Real Estate Appraisers 
Entered into a Lawful Agreement with the Bureau of Occupational Licenses, 
Granting Authority to Initiate Investigations Without a Formal Motion of the 
Board. 
The Idaho Board of Real Estate Appraisers is a part of the Department of Self Governing 
Agencies. I.e. § 67-2601 (2)(b). Additionally, the Bureau of Occupational Licenses was created 
within the department of self-governing agencies. I.e. § 67-2601(3). State law provides that "the 
bureau of occupational licenses created in the department of self-governing agencies by Section 67-
2601, Idaho Code, shall be empowered, by written agreement between the bureau and each agency 
for which it provides administrative or other services as provided by law, to provide such services 
for the ... real estate appraiser board." (Emphasis added.) I.e. § 67-2602(1). 
The Idaho Real Estate Appraiser's Act is found at Chapter 41, Title 54, of the Idaho Code. 
The Act provides that, "the board shall have, in addition to the powers conferred elsewhere in this 
lThis statute was amended in 2008 to remove this requirement. 
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chapter, the following powers and duties: (a) To authorize, by written agreement, the bureau of 
occupational licenses to act as its agent in its interest; ... (c) To conduct investigations into 
violations of the provisions of this chapter." (Emphasis added.) I.e. § 54-4106(2). 
Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Idaho State Real Estate Appraiser Board entered into 
the "Agreement for Services Between the Idaho State Real Estate Appraiser Board and the Bureau 
of Occupational Licenses" ("Agreement") on July 1,2004. (R. Agency, Vol. I, Tab No. 25, p. 1.) 
On July 1, 2007, the Board ratified the "Renewal Addendum of Agreement for Services Between 
the Idaho State Real Estate Appraiser Board and the Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses." Id. 
The Agreement can be found attached as Exhibit "A" to the Aff. of Budd Hetrick. R. Agency, Vol. 
I, Tab No. 25. The Agreement provides in pertinent part: 
14. 
COMPLAINTS 
As described in EXHIBIT A, the IBOL shall receive complaints against licensees and 
acknowledge receipt of complaints in writing on behalf of the Board. The IBOL shall 
review complaints to determine if the complaint falls within the Board's regulatory 
authority and shall refer those that are within that authority for investigation by the 
IBOL. .. .The IBOL shall conduct investigations of complaints within the Board's 
authority ... .The IBOL shall report the results of investigations to the Board or its 
designee to determine if further action is appropriate. The IBOL shall notify the 
complaining party of the IBOL's action and the basis for the action. 
The IBOL shall conduct investigations of complaints within the Board's authority ... 
the IBOL shall report the results of investigations to the Board or its designee to 
determine if further action is appropriate. The IBOL shall take such actions as the 
Board may direct and report that action to the complainant. 
R. Agency, Vol. 1, Tab No. 25, Exh. "A," Agreement For Services Between the Idaho State Real 
Estate Appraiser Board and the Bureau of Occupational Licenses, <j[ 14, p. 7. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 5. 
The Agreement, further provides in pertinent part: 
EXHIBIT A 
IBOL COMPLAINT POLICY AND PROCEDURE 
The IBOL has a policy of operating from written and signed complaints. Persons 
attempting to submit verbal or 3rd party complaints shall be advised that all 
complaints must be in writing and signed by the complainant before the IBOL shall 
consider them." (Emphasis added.) 
The IBOL performs an initial brief review of all new complaints to insure that 
adequate information has been submitted and that jurisdiction exists. If additional 
information is necessary, a letter of request is sent to the complainant. If the 
complaint is determined to be outside the jurisdiction of the board, the complainant 
is notified of that fact, as well as other avenues that may be pursued. The complaint 
may also be referred to another governmental entity for consideration. 
If further action on a complaint is warranted, subsequent to review, the original 
complaint document shall be assigned a complaint number by the IBOL. The IBOL 
prepares both a master file and an investigative file, and registers the complaint 
number in the complaint log. The complaint is then assigned to the investigative unit 
for such investigation as may be necessary to discover evidence as to whether or not 
a violation of the applicable regulations has occurred. The master files are kept in 
the lBOL office. The master file for each complaint will ultimately consist of the 
original complaint, investigative documents, evidence, and correspondence received 
during the course of investigation. The complainant shall be provided written 
notification that an investigation will take place and notice of the results of the 
investigation or subsequent action when the process is complete. 
The IBOL will conduct a review of all new and existing complaints on a regular 
basis. Each complaint will be reviewed to monitor the current status of the 
complaint, to receive investigative progress reports, and to determine any appropriate 
action that may be necessary. The complaint may be referred to a technical advisor 
for input at any time during the process. The technical advisors chosen from names 
recommended by the Board or from other licensees as may be necessary to provide 
expert opinions concerning professional ethics, scopes of practice, and other 
evaluations of professional procedure as may be necessary. If a Board member 
serves as a technical advisor for a particular investigation, the IBOL will recommend 
that the member be recused from any subsequent board action concerning the matter. 
Once the investigation is deemed complete and adequate, the IBOL will either make 
a recommendation to the Board regarding possible action or refer the investigation 
to a deputy from the Office of the Attorney General for review. The Deputy Attorney 
General CDAG") will serve as prosecuting attorney and will review the investigation 
to determine if some form of legal action would be appropriate to address the issues 
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in the complaint. The DAG will present a "blind" review of the investigation to the 
Board, together with a recommendation of possible action. The Board shall provide 
such direction and recommendations as may be necessary to allow mOL or the DAG 
to pursue the resolution of complaints. Such final resolution may include closure 
without action or any other action up to and including license revocation. The Board, 
the mOL, or the DAG may refer complaints to other appropriate city, county, or 
Federal authorities for further review or action. 
The Board shall be notified prior to any final action on a complaint under the Board's 
jurisdiction. While Formal Complaints may be initially approved by the mOL, all 
final determinations regarding Formal Complaints shall only be made subsequent to 
the approval of the Board. Consent agreements may be negotiated between the DAG 
prior to presentation to the Board, but the final decision making authority shall 
always rest with the Board. The Board must formally accept all consent agreements, 
final orders, and other disciplinary actions before they shall be considered valid. 
Original complaints and other materials submitted to or obtained by the mOL, during 
the course of investigation or otherwise, and the subsequent action regarding original 
complaints shall not be a public record and shall not be disclosed. Formal 
disciplinary action including consent orders, stipulated agreements, formal 
complaints and any resulting sanction, restriction, advisory, reprimand, and condition 
adopted by the Board shall be a public record and subject to public disclosure. 
R. Agency, Vol. I, Tab No. 25, Exh. "A," Agreement For Services Between the Idaho State Real 
Estate Appraiser Board and the Bureau of Occupational Licenses, Exh. "A," IBOL Complaint 
Policy and Procedure, p. 17. 
The above discussion explains the Board's statutory authority to enter into the 2004 
Agreement with mOL. Under this Agreement, the Board clearly grants mOL the authority to initiate 
investigations on its behalf. The Agreement establishes the only "Board approved" procedures for 
conducting said investigations. Pursuant to Exhibit "A" of the Agreement, mOL was clearly within 
its authority to initiate the J anoush investigation after receiving a written and signed complaint. R. 
Agency, Vol. I, Tab No. 25, Exh. "A," Agreement For Services Benveen the Idaho State Real Estate 
Appraiser Board and the Bureau of Occupational Licenses, Exh. "A," IBOL Complaint Policy and 
Procedure, p. 17. 
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2. The Bureau of Occupational Licenses Was Not Precluded from Initiating an 
Investigation Due to the Absence of a Sworn Complaint. 
Williams argues that "while I.e. § 54-4106(2)(c) provides the general authority for the Board 
to conduct investigations into the activities of licensed appraisers, I.e. § 54-4107 provides the 
specific method by which the Board may initiate these investigations." Petitioner's Brief, p. 19. 
Williams then cites the 2005 version of I.e. § 54-4107, and states that "[t]he board shall upon a 
written sworn complaint or may upon its own motion investigate the actions of any state licensed 
or certified real estate appraiser. ... " Id. (Emphasis in Petitioner's Brief.) Williams then argues that 
"where two statutes appear to apply the same case or subject matter, the specific statute will control 
over the more general statute." Id. at 20. 
While it is a general rule of statutory construction that specific statutes control over general 
statutes, it is also well established law that statutes relating to the same subject matter must be 
construed together and in harmony. Paolini v. Albertsons, Inc., 143 Idaho 547,149 P.3d 822,824 
(2006). It is also a well established rule of statutory construction that an agency's interpretation of 
a statute that it is charged with administering will be given substantial deference and will be upheld 
unless unreasonable. l.R. Simp/of Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 120 Idaho 849 (1991); 
Pearl v. Board of Professional Discipline of the Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, ]37 Idaho 107 (2002). 
The 2005 version of I.e. § 54-4107(1), was in effect on July 1,2004; the date the Board 
entered into the "Agreement for Services Between the Idaho State Real Estate Appraiser Board and 
the Bureau of Occupational Licenses." When the specific contract language establishing the formal 
policy and procedure for the handling the investigation of complaints is compared against the 
provisions of I.e. § 54-4107( 1) in effect at that time (same as the 2005 version), it is clear that the 
Board interpreted its law to allow the Bureau to conduct investigations based upon a "written and 
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signed complaint." R. Agency, Vol. I, Tab No. 25, Exh. "A," Agreement For Services Between the 
Idaho State Real Estate Appraiser Board and the Bureau of Occupational Licenses, Exh. "A," IBOL 
Complaint Policy and Procedure, p. 17. The Board has never interpreted its law to require "sworn 
complaints" prior to the Bureau initiating an investigation, which is also consistent with the Board's 
general power to investigate. See, I.e. § 54-4106(2)(c). 
In the alternative, the Board's interpretation of the statute is that if Mr. Janoush had filed a 
"sworn" complaint, the specific terms of the pre-July 1,2008, I.e. § 54-41 07( 1) would have required 
an investigation. However, because Mr. Janoush did not file a sworn complaint, the more general 
provisions of I.e. § 54-4106(2)( c) permitted an investigation. That is, the pre-July 1,2008 version 
of I.e. § 54-4107(1) taken together with I.e. § 54-4106(2)(c), provides mOL with discretion to 
investigate any alleged violations of the Board's law or rules that came to its attention, unless a 
person has filed a written sworn complaint with the Board, in which case the Board had no discretion 
whether to investigate, but "shall" investigate. 
Pursuant to its statute. the Board lawfully granted mOL the authority to initiate investigations 
on its behalf based upon a written and signed complaint. There has been no showing that the 
Board's interpretation of its own law violated any constitutional or statutory provisions; exceeded 
the Board's statutory authority; were made upon unlawful procedure; were unsupported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
Therefore, the court must defer to the agency's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly 
erroneous and unsupported by evidence in the record. Cooper, 134 Idaho at 454. 
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Additionally, to the extent there was any error in the original complaint procedure, the Board 
rectified the same in its Remand Order (R. Agency, Vol. I, Tab No. 41) on January 31,2011, in 
which it stated "the Board hereby ratifies the investigation and formal action in this matter." 
c. Petitioner's Issues Raised for the First Time on Appeal With Respect to Idaho Code § 
54-4107(1)(c), (d), (e) are Precluded from Consideration and Fail on the Merits. 
In section D of Petitioner's Brief, Williams raises several issues with respect to the statutory 
bases for some of the findings against him. One of his issues is raised for the first time to this Court. 
The other issues were raised for the first time on appeal to the District Court, as noted by the District 
Court. (R., p. 59l.) 
The Board raised its objection to the consideration of his arguments on these issues in its 
Respondent's Brief to the District Court and at oral argument. (R., p. 486; Tr., p. 36. L.21, p. 37, 
L.2.) To the extent the District Court considered these improperly raised issues, it erred in engaging 
in a review of the issue; however, the Board does not disagree with the reasoning it employed in its 
review. The Board preserved its objection to the review of issues on appeal and does not now waive 
its objection. Hence, any issues not argued to the Hearing Officer or Board are precluded from 
consideration by this Court. Whitted v. Canyon County Board of Comrnissioners, 137 Idaho 118, 
121-122 (2002). Therefore, none of the issues argued in Section D of Petitioner's Brief are 
appropriately before this Court and should not be considered. 
1. The Constitutionality on.c. § 54-4107 Is on Appeal For The First Time to This 
Court And May Not Be Considered, and the Statute Is Sufficiently Definite to 
Satisfv Due Process. 
The Hearing Officer and the Board found that Williams violated I.e. § 54-4107(l)(c) by 
making a substantial misrepresentation regarding his accessing the Wells Fargo RETECH system 
under the user name and password of other appraisers; that Williams violated I.e. § 54-4107(l)(c) 
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and (e) by certifying that he personally inspected the two properties when he did not do so; and that 
his conduct as related to the Donnelly Appraisal also violated I.e. § 54-4107(l)(d) and (e). (R. 
Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 96, Final Order, p. 2.) Williams now argues that I.e. § 54-4107(l)(c) and 
(e) are unconstitutionally vague, thereby violating his due process. 
However, this is the first time Williams has raised this issue; he did not raise it before the 
Hearing Officer, the Board, or the District Court. Hence. Williams' constitutional issue is improperly 
raised. Cowan v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Fremont Cry., 143 Idaho 501, 510 (2006). Therefore, it is 
precluded from consideration by this Court. Id. 
Additionally, the terms in the statute with which the Petitioner now takes issue, are 
sufficiently definite to adequately warn licensed real estate appraisers as to what conduct is 
prohibited. Specifically, Williams contends that the terms "substantial misrepresentation" (I.e. § 54-
4107(l)(c» and "being negligent or incompetent" (I.e. § 54-4107(l)(e» are so vague that 
Mr. Wi1liams was unable to discern what conduct would subject him to discipline. (Petitioner's 
Brief, p. 26.) However, each of these statutory provisions provide constitutionally sufficient notice 
of the conduct that could subject Mr. Williams to discipline. 
Initially, a term is not void for vagueness when it can be reasonably and rationally interpreted 
based on the ordinary and common meaning of the words. Dupont v. Idaho St. Bd. Of Land 
Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 618, 623 (2000). Further, the fact that the application of a term is determined 
on a fact specific basis and may vary from case to case does not render it unconstitutionally vague. 
Id. The court will still consider whether the term can be reasonably interpreted. 
Furthermore, in the professional licensing context, a term is not unconstitutionally vague 
when it is evaluated against the declared standards of a profession. This Court has found that grounds 
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for discipline are unconstitutionally vague when a professional licensing board only uses its 
collective knowledge, expertise, and experience to determine whether a licensee's conduct was 
subject to discipline. H & V Engr., Inc. v. Idaho St. Bd. of Prof Engrs. and Land Surveyors, 113 
Idaho 646, 650 (1987); Tuma v. Bd. of Nursing, 100 Idaho 74 (1979). The boards in those cases 
applied their knowledge on a case by case basis essentially resulting in an ex postfacto standard of 
conduct. Hence, there was no pre-existing "backdrop" against which a licensee or a court could 
evaluate or review the licensee's conduct. Id. 
A board provides a backdrop by setting a standard of conduct. Id. Similarly, although some 
terms standing alone may be ambiguous, when a professional licensing board sets standards against 
which those terms can be judged, a licensee has adequate notice in advance of his conduct. Tuma, 
100 Idaho at 80. Once the backdrop is set by professional standards, a hearing officer may be guided 
on the application of those professional standards through the use of expert testimony at the hearing. 
Kruegerv. Bd. (~f Pr~fessional Discipline (~l1daho State Bd. of Medicine, 122 Idaho 577, 580 (1992). 
When the standard is furthered elucidated by testimony of individuals with experience, technical 
competence, or specialized knowledge, a hearing officer is properly able to determine whether the 
licensee's conduct met the professional standard. !d. at 580-581. In these circumstances, grounds 
for discipline meet constitutional standards. 
In short, the void for vagueness doctrine only requires that professional standards of conduct 
"cannot be kept secret from the professionals or the courts." H & V Engineering, 113 Idaho at 651. 
Ultimately, statutory grounds for discipline are sufficiently definite to satisfy due process when a 
Board declares the standards against which a licensee's conduct will be evaluated, and then when 
a licensee is called to account for his conduct, it evaluates that conduct against those standards. 
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In this case, the term "substantial misrepresentation" in I.e. § 54-4107(1)( c) is sufficiently 
definite because it can be reasonably interpreted by its ordinary meaning. The dictionary definition 
of "misrepresent" is "to give a false or misleading representation of [,] usually with an intent to 
deceive or be unfair." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 744 (lOth Ed., 1999). Although the 
definition references that a misrepresentation is usually accompanied by an intent to deceive, intent 
of the individual making the misrepresentation is not a required element. Also, one of the definitions 
of the term "substantial" is "considerable in quantity" and "significantly great." Merriam-Webster, 
1174. Further, another meaning of "substantial" is "having great meaning or lasting effect," and 
antonyms are identified as "inconsequential, inconsiderable, insignificant, little, minor, negligible." 
Merriam-Webster Thesaurus, Merriam-Webster.com. 27 Dec. 2013, <www.merriam-
webster.comlthesaurus/substantial>. Thus. the term "substantial misrepresentation" can be 
reasonably interpreted using the ordinary meaning that when an licensed appraiser makes a 
representation that is false or misleading, and which is more than inconsequential, that licensee has 
made a substantial misrepresentation and is subject to discipline. 
Additionally, the terms "negligent" and "incompetent" as used in I.e. § 54-4107(l)(e) are 
not unconstitutionally vague because they have a common meaning and are measured against the 
declared professional standards of the Board. At the outset, as the District Court noted, the usual and 
common meaning of the terms negligent and incompetent may be employed and do not require 
further definition. (R., pp. 591-592.) Furthermore, subsection (l)(e) states in full, as a grounds for 
discipline, "being negligent or incompetent, as defined in the uniform standards of professional 
appraisal practices in developing an appraisal and preparing an appraisal report or in communicating 
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an appraisal." Thus the terms negligent and incompetent do not stand alone and are measured against 
the backdrop of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practices (USPAP). 
The USP AP sets forth the minimal standards of performance and skill required of real estate 
appraisers. The statute directly states that the USPAP is the standard for developing an appraisal, 
preparing an appraisal report, or in communicating an appraisal. More so, lDAPA 24.18.01.700 
provides "[t]he [USPAP] as published by the Appraisal Foundation and referenced in Section 004, 
are hereby adopted as the rules of conduct for all Real Estate Appraisers licensed under Title 54, 
Chapter 41, Idaho Code and these rules." This notice in statute and rule is very different from the 
unannounced standards at issue in Tuma and H & V, in which the licensees' conduct was only 
measured against the boards' experience and knowledge. In this case, the standards of conduct to 
which Mr. Williams was held were not hidden or secret; the Board had explicitly declared that the 
USP AP was the declared standards of the profession. 
Additionally, as reviewed by the District Court, the Hearing Officer heard testimony 
regarding Williams' conduct in comparison to the standards of the USPAP. (R., pp. 578-579,581-
582,587-589.) Accordingly, the Hearing Officer and Board were guided on the application of the 
USP AP through the use of expert testimony at the hearing. Thus, the Hearing Officer properly 
evaluated Mr. Williams' conduct against the professional standards adopted in statute and rule. 
Ultimately, I.e. § 54-4107( 1)( e) is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process because Mr. Williams 
had notice that his conduct was required to conform to the USPAP, as the standards of his 
profession, and his conduct was evaluated against those standards. 
In conclusion, Mr. Williams was afforded due process because the statutes and rules of the 
Board, through their ordinary meaning and by the express declaration of standards of conduct, were 
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sufficiently definite to adequately notify him of the professional standards to which he would be held 
and the conduct that would subject him to discipline. 
2. Petitioner's Issues Raised on Appeal for the First Time to the District Court 
Were Improper and May Not Be Considered. 
The Petitioner reasserts a number of issues regarding the statutory bases for some of the 
findings against him, which he raised for the first time on appeal to the District Court. However, 
these issues were improperly raised at that point and are again improperly raised here; and therefore, 
they should not be determined by this Court. Whitted, 137 Idaho at 122. For an issue to be properly 
raised for judicial review, '"the record must reveal an adverse ruling" on that issue. ld. at 121. 
Therefore, the only way to preserve an issue for appeal is to raise it before the Board.ld. at 122. 
The District Court correctly noted that the issues regarding the bases for finding violations 
under I.C § 54-4107(1)( c ), (d), and ( e) were improperly raised for the firsttime on judicial review. 
(R., p. 591.) Although the District Court's cursory discussion regarding the flaws in Williams' 
argument on these issues was substantively correct, it procedurally erred to the extent it engaged in 
the determination of the issues because those issues were not properly before it. Similarly, these 
issues are not properly raised for consideration before this Court. The issues were not preserved for 
appeal because the Board was never given the opportunity to make a determination on these 
arguments; the agency record does not reflect an adverse determination on these issues. 
More so, Williams' argument regarding these issues lacks merit because (1) the Board found 
that Williams violated the Board's statutes, rules, and standards in the USPAP, which supports a 
finding of the violation of I.C § 54-4107(1 jed); (2) negligence and incompetence are determined 
as a whole by the USP AP; and (3) the Board was justified in finding that the substantial error in the 
Donnelly Appraisal was a substantial misrepresentation in violation of I.C § 54-4107(1)(c). 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF· 15. 
First, the Board found Williams violated I.e. § 54-4107(1)(d) with respect to the Donnelly 
Appraisal. As further discussed below, the Board found that Williams' actions with respect to this 
appraisal were in violation of not only I.e. § 54-4107(l)(d) and (e), but also IDAPA 24.18.01.700, 
and USPAP (2005) Standards l-l(b), 1-2(e)(l) and 1-3(a). (R. Agency, Vol. II, Tab ~o. 96, p. 2.) 
Thus, Williams was found to have violated other "provisions of this chapter and any rules of the 
board" separate and apart from I. e. § 54-4107 ( 1 )( e). Hence, the Board's findings that he violated I. e. 
§ 54-4107(l)(d) have a sound basis in the Record and are not duplicative or redundant. 
Second, Williams' argument that the terms "negligent" and "incompetent" are not 
specifically defined in the USPAP is misleading, although now Williams appears to characterize this 
argument as void for vagueness, as discussed above. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 27.) The Board will not 
restate its argument again, except to assert that the fact that these words do not have specific, 
independent definitions in the USP AP does not render the statute hollow. The standards prescribed 
in the USP AP are the gauge to determine what conduct is negligent and incompetent. Further, this 
court must "interpret a statute in a manner that will not nullify it, and it is not to be presumed that 
the legislature performed an idle act of enacting a superfluous statute." Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 
568, 571-572 (1990). The court will construe a statute to avoid "mere surplusage of provisions 
included therein" and to give it a reasonable operation of law. [d. Therefore, rather than finding that 
I.e. § 54-4107(1)( e) is meaningless, this Court should affirm the lower court's determination that 
the terms negligent and incompetent are capable of interpretation and may be reasonably construed 
against the backdrop of the USPAP. (R., pp. 591-592.) 
The Record reflects that the Hearing Officer and Board reviewed the USP AP standards 
applicable to Williams in those counts where the Board ultimately found a violation of I.e. § 54-
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4107( 1)( e) (the two counts relating to Williams' failure to personally inspect properties and the count 
relating to the Donnelly Appraisal), and thus they based a finding of a violation of that statute upon 
Williams' failure to adhere to the requirements of the USPAP. Accordingly, the Board's findings 
that Williams violated I.e. § 54-4107(l)(e) are supported by fact and well founded in the law. 
Lastly, Williams tries to parse words in attacking the Board's finding that his Donnelly 
Appraisal contained a substantial misrepresentation with respect to the available sewer facilities in 
violation of I.e. § 54-4107(l)(c). The Hearing Officer plainly found that Williams' appraisal 
contained a significant, material misrepresentation regarding the availability of sewer services to the 
appraised properties. And although the Hearing Officer deemed this to be a "substantial error," the 
fact remains that this information in the Donnelly Appraisal constituted a substantial 
misrepresentation of the sewer services available to the properties, whether or not it was intentional. 
The information was both an error and a misrepresentation. The Board was well within its discretion 
to find a violation of I.e. § 54-4107(l)(c) based upon the evidence produced in the hearing and the 
findings of the Hearing Officer. 
D. There Was Substantial and Competent Evidence Supporting the Wells Fargo 
RETECHS Charge (Count One). 
Mr. Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence before the Board to find against him 
with respect to Count One involving the Wells Fargo RETECHS system. This Count alleged that 
Williams had accessed the Wells Fargo RETECHS real estate appraiser computerized bidding 
system on multiple occasions using a competitor appraiser's name and password, which access 
allowed Williams to underbid the competitor. Count One alleged this was a violation of I.e.§ 54-
4107(1)(c), which prohibits making any substantial misrepresentation, false promise or false or 
fraudulent representation. (See R. Agency, Vol. I, Tab No. 53, Amended Complaint, p. 2.) After a 
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thorough review of the agency record, the District Court agreed with the Hearing Officer's findings 
that Williams' conduct violated I.e. § 54-4107(l)(c). (R., pp. 572-576.) 
The Hearing Officer found the following with respect to Count One (see R. Agency, Vol. II, 
Tab No. 88, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order, pp. 4-11): 
1) That the Wells Fargo RETECHS system was an online bidding system for 
Idaho appraisers to present bids for appraisal work to Wells Fargo Bank by 
submitting bids by email to the bank's website, including the dollar amount for the 
service and the time to perform the service. Each eligible appraiser was provided a 
username and password by Wells Fargo under which the appraiser was invited by 
email from Wells Fargo to submit bids for Wells Fargo appraisal work. 
2) Petitioner Williams accessed RETECHS, without any authorization, on 
twelve to fifteen separate occasions using the username and password of appraiser 
Brad Janoush and/or Brad Knipe during 2002. This finding was based on several 
pieces of evidence, including: 
a) Scott Calhoun observed Williams entering the user names and passwords 
of Janoush and Knipe; 
b) Williams admitted to Tony Orman that he entered RETECHS under the 
names and passwords of Knipe and J anoush; 
c) Williams admitted in a March 2003 deposition he had entered RETECHS 
under Janoush's username and password; 
d) Williams admitted to Dean Emmanuels he entered RETECHS under 
Janoush's username and password. Significantly, Emmanuels was Williams' 
own witness at the hearing; 
e) Williams admitted to Sam Langston, who was Williams' business partner 
at the time of the admission, that he entered RETECHS under Janoush's 
username and password ten to fifteen times. Williams also admitted to 
Langston that his doing so was "stupid" thing to do; 
f) Langston dissolved the business of Langston-Williams, Inc. after Williams' 
admission based upon Langston's belief that Williams had engaged in 
inappropriate conduct by using other appraisers' user names and passwords 
to enter RETECHS. 
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3) Access to RETECHS under other users' user names and passwords 
provided Williams the opportunity to observe what those appraisers were bidding on 
Wells Fargo's requests for appraisal services in terms of the dollar amounts of the 
other appraisers' bids and other appraisers' estimated completion times. 
4) During 2002 the Knipe, Janoush, Knipe firm experienced a reduction of 
work for Wells Fargo in 2002 at the time Williams was accessing the RETECHS 
accounts of J anoush and Knipe. Wells Fargo indicated to this firm the reason for the 
reduction in business was because it was consistently being underbid by another 
appraiser. J anoush later submitted a test bid to Wells Fargo in the RETECHS system 
by bidding on a project with a substantially discounted price and an unusually short 
completion date. He later learned that he was underbid on that project both on price 
and the completion time frame. 
5) Williams chose not to deny any of the allegations made against him at the 
hearing with respect to his unauthorized RETECHS access. 
Thus, there was substantial and competent evidence submitted to the Hearing Officer to 
prove that Williams had improperly accessed the RETECHS system as alleged. This, standing alone, 
is a violation of I.C § 54A107(1 )(c), where Williams made false representations to Wells Fargo 
regarding his identity, which false representations allowed him to gain an unfair business advantage 
over J anoush and Knipe with respect to Wells Fargo appraisal work. 
On judicial review, Williams still does not deny that he accessed the RETECHS system as 
alleged. Rather, he argues that there was no evidence that he ever looked at bids of other appraisers 
when he accessed the RETECHS system, or that any other appraiser's business was impacted by his 
activities. Williams further tries to argue that Wells Fargo never intended for the RETECHS system 
to be confidential. These arguments fail to undermine the findings of the Hearing Officer and the 
Final Order of the Board. 
First, with respect to Williams' argument that there was no evidence he ever looked at bids 
of other appraisers on the RETECHS system, the findings of the Hearing Officer are most 
appropriate. As the Hearing Officer observed: 
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Such access on an admitted 12-15 occasions cannot have been out of innocent 
motives. It is possible that Mr. Williams may have entered RETECHS under other 
appraisers' user names and passwords once or twice out of curiosity just to see if he 
could do so. The only conceivable reason for Mr. Williams to enter RETECHS 
twelve to fifteen times under other appraisers' user names and passwords was so that 
Mr. Williams could observe what other appraisers were bidding on specific appraisal 
projects. 
Jd., at 10. Williams claims in his Brief on Appeal that he "has never denied that when Wells Fargo 
Bank had established the RETECHS bidding system in 2002 he, out of curiosity, logged onto the 
first page of the system under another appraiser's name .... "(Petitioner's Brief, p. 29.) Yet as the 
Hearing Officer deduced, curiosity does not explain why Williams would have done so 12-15 times. 
!d. The only logical reason for Williams to continue misrepresenting himself to Wells Fargo 
repeatedly well past the curious stage was to obtain the information contained in those accounts. Jd. 
More importantly, however, as the Hearing Officer duly noted, I.e. § 54-4107(1 )(c) does not 
have a requirement of damages or even ill intent. !d., at 11. Rather, it simply prohibits H[mJaking 
any substantial misrepresentation, false promises or false or fraudulent misrepresentation." I.e. § 
54-4107( 1 )(c). Thus, Williams violated the statute merely by logging in as someone he was not. The 
clear intent behind the RETECHS system was for appraisers to be able to submit appraisal bids for 
Wells Fargo work. By logging in as lanoush and Knipe between 12-15 times, Williams was 
misrepresenting who he was to Wells Fargo. which in turn allowed Williams to view the information 
that would normally be confined to the individual assigned to the account. 
The misrepresentation and fraud is significant here given the context in which it took place. 
As a licensed real estate appraiser, Williams was misrepresenting himself to a major lending 
institution and source of business for real estate appraisers, which misrepresentations allowed him 
access to sensitive bidding information from his competitors that would enable him to undercut them 
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on appraisal bids. Such misrepresentations go to the very core of integrity and fairness among 
licensed appraisers and had the potential to financially damage those affected by Williams' actions. 
Second, with respect to Williams' claim that no damages were proven as a result of his use 
of the RETECHS system, again, there is no requirement for a showing of damages under I.e. § 54-
4107(l)(c), as explained above. 
More so, the Hearing Officer also noted 1 anoush' s testimony that his appraisal business with 
Wells Fargo was reduced during 2002, which was the time Williams was logging into lanoush's 
RETECHS account. Id., at 11. The Hearing Officer also noted that even when lanoush entered a bid 
that was substantially lower than normal, along with a completion time that was significantly shorter 
than ususal, he was nevertheless outbid. Id., at 6-7. Thus, there was substantiaL competent evidence 
to demonstrate that "Mr. Williams received an unfair advantage over his competitor appraisers by 
entering RETECHS under the names of lanoush and Knipe, and that the KJK firm suffered a 
reduction of business as a direct result." Id., at II. 
Third, Petitioner's argument that the RETECHS system was not meant to be confidential is 
belied by several problems. Initially, whether the system was confidential or not, the undisputed fact 
remains that Williams represented himself to be either 1 anoush or Knipe repeatedly to the RETECHS 
system by using their user names and passwords. It is also undisputed that by doing so Williams was 
purposely accessing their appraisal bid information, not his own. "By entering RETECHS under a 
user name and password, Mr. Williams represented to Wells Fargo that he was the person authorized 
to use the assigned user name and password." Id., at 10. This is a blatant misrepresentation and fraud 
upon the Wells Fargo system, regardless of whether it was meant to be confidential or not. 
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More so, the system was obviously meant to be confidential. The fact that it required a user 
name and password for access, as well as the fact that the very nature of the system was to allow 
appraisers to enter confidential bids on Wells Fargo appraisal work, plainly showed that the intent 
of the system was to be confidential. As the Hearing Officer found, "[tJhe fact that Wells Fargo 
attempted to protect access to the on-line bidding system by the use of the user names and passwords 
establishes that Wells Fargo intended the system to be confidential." ld., at 10. The confidentiality 
of the system created a process through which Wells Fargo received the lowest bid while being fair 
to competing appraisers. 
Accordingly, the District Court found that there was substantial and competent evidence in 
the record to support the Hearing Officer's findings. CR., p. 576.) Also, it agreed with the Board that 
Williams' conduct in accessing the RETECHS system using other appraisers' names and passwords 
rose to the level of a violation of I.C § 54-4107(l)(c). Id. This Court should find the same; the 
Board's Final Order as to the Wells Fargo RETECHS issue must be upheld on judicial review. 
E. There 'Vas Substantial and Competent Evidence Supporting the Board's Findings as 
to Williams' Failure to Personally Inspect Properties. 
The District Court's detailed review of the agency record demonstrated that there was 
substantial and competent evidence to support the Hearing Officer's determination that Williams had 
falsely certified that he personally inspected appraised properties and that this constituted violations 
ofI.C § 54-4107(l)(c) and (e). (R., p. 582.) The Hearing Officer found that the evidence showed 
that, as alleged in two separate instances, Williams certified that he had personally inspected 
properties as part of appraisals when he had not done so. (R. Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 96, Final 
Order, p. 2.) 
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Specifically, with respect to two properties-the Center Partners Call Center property 
appraisal (R. Agency, Exh. 45) and the Tri-Circle Facility on Oneida Street in Rupert, Idaho (R. 
Agency, Exh. 54 )-the Board found Williams had co-signed certifications for these appraisals stating 
he and another appraiser "have made a personal inspection of the property that is the subject of this 
report" when Williams had never visited the properties prior to make the certifications. (R. Agency, 
Vol. II, Tab No. 88, Findings, pp. 11-19.) The Hearing Officer found that Williams' actions violated 
I.e. § 54-4107( 1)( c) (making any substantial misrepresentation, false promise, or false or fraudulent 
misrepresentation): I.e. § 54-4107(1)(e) (negligence or incompetence as defined by professional 
standards in developing or communicating an appraisal); and USPAP 2001 and 2002 Ethics 
Rule-Conduct Section, and Standards Rules I-I (c), 2-(1 )(a) and 2-3 by certifying he personally 
inspected the properties when he did not do so. (See id., p. 15 for the text of the rules.) The record 
shows there was substantial and competent evidence to support both findings by the Board. 
First, the record established there was no evidence in the appraiser job files that Williams 
personally inspected those properties. (Id., pp. 12-13, U 30, 37.) And in fact, one of the two 
individuals with whom Williams had co-signed on the appraisal report (Calhoun) had asked 
Williams to remove the language in those reports certifying Williams had personally inspected the 
properties based on that appraiser's belief that Williams had not done so. (Id., p. 13, q[ 39.) And in 
one instance, Calhoun actually removed the certification paragraph from an appraisal report based 
on his belief Williams had not visited the property, although Williams subsequently replaced the 
language and threatened Calhoun with not being paid if he refused to sign it with the joint 
certification language. (Id., p. 13, q[ 40.) Williams had admitted to an attorney, Larry Prince, in the 
presence of Calhoun that Williams had not, prior to the issuance of the appraisal report, personally 
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inspected the Tri-Circle Facility on Oneida Street in Rupert, Idaho. (R. Agency, Exh. 54.) (ld., p. 
13,'1{42.) 
And with respect to the Center Partners Call Center property appraisal (R. Agency, Exh. 45), 
the Hearing Officer found, "it was highly unlikely that Mr. Williams personally inspected the 
appraised property because of the distance from Boise, the short time window to complete the 
appraisal, no evidence in the job file that Mr. Williams personally inspected, and the fact that 
Mr. Williams did not follow the office protocol of billing for travel costs associated with the 
appraisal." (ld., p. 14, ~[44.) The Hearing Office found that Williams' office protocol was for travel 
expenses to be deducted off the top before the fee split between Williams and Calhoun. But in this 
instance, no travel expenses had been deducted for a trip to Post Falls." (ld., p. 18.) 
Although Williams presented other evidence at the hearing that he had personally inspected 
many of the properties identified in Counts Two through Five, the Hearing Officer and Board found 
that Williams had not inspected these two properties (Tri-Circle Facility and Center Partners Call 
Center property) based on the evidence above. Id. 
Williams now argues there is no requirement upon an appraiser to personally inspect a 
property as part of the appraisal process. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 32.) Yet the finding against Williams 
was not that he had simply failed to do the personal inspection, but that he had certified in the 
appraisal report he had done so. The language in the Center Partners Call Center property Certificate 
of Appraisal signed by Williams states: "We have made a personal inspection of the property that 
is the subject of this report." (R. Agency, Exh. 45-A, p. 8.) The same language appears in the 
Certificate of Appraisal for the Tri-Circle Facility (R. Agency, Exh. 54-A, p. 9). This was a violation 
of the pertinent laws cited by the Board where Williams had not actually done so. 
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And although Williams testified he had personally inspected the properties, the Hearing 
Officer found against him based on all other evidence presented as identified above. As Idaho courts 
have held, "[s]ubstantial and competent evidence need not be uncontradicted, nor does it need to 
necessarily lead to a certain conclusion." Cowan, 143 Idaho at 517. This standard holds true even 
though there is conflicting evidence in the record. Soto v. Simp/at, 126 Idaho 536, 539 (1994). 
Again, Williams himself told attorney Prince he had not inspected the Tri-Circle Facility prior to 
signing the certification, and the evidence with respect to the Center Partners Call Center property 
was more than sufficient to support the Hearing Officer's determination. By the plain language of 
the certifications in those appraisals, Williams had stated he had personally inspected the properties. 
Also, Wi lliams argues that all the USPAP standards require to establish a personal inspection 
is the signed certificate of the appraiser. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 33.) But this sidesteps the question 
at issue as to whether Williams truthfully signed the certificates on these two properties. The 
evidence found by the Hearing Officer and adopted by the Board was that Williams had not 
truthfully signed these two certificates, and in so doing had violated the laws and rules at issue. 
Hence, the Board's Final Order must be upheld as to these charges. 
F. There Was Substantial and Competent Evidence Supporting the Board's Findings as 
to the Donnelly Appraisal. 
Again after a detailed review of the record, the District Court found in favor of the Board 
regarding the determination that in preparing the Donnelly Appraisal, Mr. Williams violated I.e. § 
54-4107(l)(e), which subjects a licensed real estate appraiser to discipline for negligent or 
incompetent preparation of appraisal reports. 
In 2005, Williams conducted an appraisal of two adjoining properties located near Donnelly, 
Idaho. One of the appraised properties was an approximately 5-acre parcel, and the other was an 
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approximately 63-acre parcel. Williams' appraisal was an opinion regarding the combined value of 
the two parcels which were under contract from two different sellers to the same buyer. Williams' 
appraisal opined that the two parcels together had an appraised value of $5,100,000. (R. Agency, Vol. 
II, Tab No. 88, Findings, p. 22.) Williams hired an assistant appraiser to assist him on this project, 
and Williams was fully responsible for the contents and conclusions ofthe appraisal. !d .. pp. 22-23. 
At the time of the appraisal there was a pressurized sewer line adjacent to the appraised 
properties, but that sewer line was at capacity and only one residential hookup was permitted by the 
sewer district for those properties. More so, the sewer district's treatment plant was also at capacity. 
It was contemplated it would be at least two years before sewer capacity would be available such that 
the appraised properties would be able to connect to sewer services for multi-use development. This 
was not reported in Williams' appraisal, although the properties were being purchased with the 
specific intent of multi-use development. !d., pp. 23-24. Instead, Williams stated in the appraisal 
report that, "the North Lake Sewer District reported that water and sewer was across the road ... :' 
Id., p. 24, q[ 65. The comment to the subject property's 5-acre parcel in the comparable land sales 
table states: "Subject located in City impact zone for commercial and sewer is across the road." (R. 
Agency, Exh. 802, p. 48.) This statement failed to clarify that only one residential hookup would be 
allowed from the appraised properties. Jd. 
USPAP (2005) Standards Rule 1- ] (b) provides: 
In developing a real property appraisal, an appraiser must: ... (b) not commit a 
substantial error of omission or commission that significantly affects an appraisal. . 
USPAP (2005) Standards Rule 1-2(e)(l) states: 
In developing a real property appraisal, an appraiser must. .. (e) identify the 
characteristics of the property that are relevant to the type and definition of value and 
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intended use of the appraisal, including (1) its location and physical, legal and 
economic attributes .... 
No departures are permitted from these two rules. 
USPAP (2005) Standards Rule 1-3(a) sets forth: 
When the value opinion to be developed is market value, and given the scope of work 
identified in accordance with Standards Rule 1-2(f), an appraiser must: 
(a) identify and analyze the effect and use and value of existing land use 
regulations, reasonably probable modifications of such land use regulations, 
economic supply and demand, the physical adaptability of the real estate, and 
market area trends .... 
In evaluating these standards, the Hearing Officer found-and the Board agreed-that the error 
regarding the sewer availability to the appraised properties was "substantial" for purposes of US PAP 
Standards Rule 1-1(b). (R. Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 88, Findings, p. 29.) In so finding, the Hearing 
Officer observed that, "[ w ]ithout sewer service availability it is unlikely that the appraised properties 
could have been developed as a mixed-use development, until the appraised properties were annexed 
into the Sewer District and sewer service was made available, likely at considerable cost to the 
developer." ld. "Mixed-use development is only possible if sewer is available for a mixed-use 
project. Consequently, a developer cares very much whether sewer service is available. or, if not, 
the terms, conditions and costs to make sewer service available." ld., p. 30. And, "because the 
Donnelly Appraisal incorrectly stated the availability of sewer service, there was no discussion or 
analysis regarding the land use regulations. There was no discussion regarding annexation into the 
Sewer District or into the City of Donnelly, or how long this would take or what it might cost, in 
violation of US PAP Standards Rule 1-3(a)." ld., pp. 30-31. 
In claiming the Board erred in finding the above, Williams does not contest the fact that his 
appraisal misleadingly identified the sewer availability to the properties and omitted substantial 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF· 27. 
information with respect to the sewer capacity actually available and how it would impact multi-use 
development on the properties. While Williams claims that his assistant appraiser (Mike Victory) 
confirmed with numerous individuals regarding the availability of sewer to the appraised properties, 
he fails to include in his argument the fact that Victory never identified to these individuals that he 
was seeking sewer connections for mixed-use property. /d., p. 24 rn 66. As the Board found, this 
misrepresentation was substantial, as it materially affected the value ofthe properties appraised due 
to the unavailability of sewer services to mixed-use properties contemplated by the sale. 
Hence, as the District Court found, there was substantial and competent evidence to support 
the Board's findings as to the Donnelly Appraisal and the sewer availability issue. Thus, the Board's 
Final Order must be upheld in that respect. 
G. Brad Janoush Never Participated in the Final Order Proceedings. 
Mr. Williams claims the Board's Final Order was tainted by the bias of Board Chairman Brad 
1 anoush, who was personally involved in the Wells Fargo RETECHS claim against Williams. 
Williams then claims that because Mr. lanoush is the Chairman of the Board he somehow 
impermissibly biased the rest of the Board members against Williams, thus tainting the final 
outcome. Williams' arguments are without merit and must be dismissed. 
As the record demonstrates, Mr. lanoush neither participated in the discussion nor voted on 
the outcome memorialized by the Final Order in this case. The Final Order itself initially notes that 
J anoush "recused himself from the discussion and voting in the matter, and Vice-Chairman Paul 
Morgan took over the meeting." (R. Agency, Vol. n, Tab No. 96, p. 1.) More so, the meeting minutes 
from the February 10,2012 Board meeting, during which the Williams proceeding was discussed 
and voted upon, also reflect that Mr. lanoush recused himself immediately upon the matter being 
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taken up for consideration; the minutes note, upon the case being presented by the Board's attorney, 
"Mr. lanoush recused himself from the discussion and voting on case REA-2008-41." (R., p. 402.) 
As such, the record demonstrates that Mr. 1 anoush never participated in the discussion and voting 
by the Board that culminated in the February 2012 Final Order. 
More so, Williams' argument that Mr. lanoush somehow poisoned the minds of the other 
Board members prior to this meeting are unfounded and speculative at best. As noted by the District 
Court, "Williams has also not provided any specific assertions as to how Mr. lanoush was able to 
taint and bias the Board vote." (R., p. 590.) That Mr. lanoush served on the Board with these other 
individuals, standing alone, cannot constitute any type of a basis for bias among the other Board 
members in this matter. Accordingly, the District Court correctly found that, based on identical 
assertions as presented to this Court, Williams had failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that 
the Hearing Officer and Board were biased. /d. 
Petitioner points to the meeting minutes of the Board from March 21, 20] 1 (Petitioner's 
Brief, p. 35), during which Mr. lanoush stated that he would recuse himself from consideration of 
the Wells Fargo RETECHS charge against Williams, but not from the remaining charges. (R., p. 
398.) Yet during that same meeting, 1 anoush abstained from voting on the sole matter relating to 
Williams on the Board agenda that day: consideration of a settlement agreement. Id. Moreover, 
J anoush' s statement refusing to recuse himself from the other charges recorded in the minutes as 
follows: "Mr. lanoush stated that it was important for him to take a position." Id. At no time did he 
communicate that he could not hear the facts of the case fairly with an open mind, that he could not 
apply Idaho law, or that he had already made up his mind as to the final outcome. Rather. he simply 
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stated he wanted to take a position-not saying what position that was-on the remaining charges in 
the case. 
Notably, at the time of the March 21, 2011 meeting, the process was still ongoing before the 
Hearing Officer. The hearing did not begin until August 2011, some five months later. The Hearing 
Officer did not issue Findings until November 15,2011, nearly eight months later. Thus, at the time 
of the March 2011 meeting, the Board was not considering anything related to the evidence presented 
in the case or findings of the Hearing Officer, as those had yet to be presented and completed. 
Further, at no time prior to February 10, 2012, did the evidence and findings ever come before the 
Board for consideration. Thus, there was no opportunity between the time Mr. lanoush made his 
statements during the March 2011 meeting, and the time he recused himself in full during the 
February 2012 meeting, for him or any other Board member to consider this case as a Board. 
Mr. Williams can say that there was a period of almost a year during which Mr. lanoush had 
a statement on the record indicating he was not going to recuse himself from all but one of the 
charges, but the fact remains that during those eleven months the Board never considered anything 
relating to Mr. Williams' case, and accordingly Mr. lanoush never had the opportunity to participate 
in any such consideration during that time period. Williams does not offer specific assertions to 
prove otherwise. Thus, the District Court properly found that Williams failed to adequately support 
his argument, and this Court should find the same. 
H. The Board's Order Was Reasonable and Within its Discretion. 
Where Williams' claims that the Board was arbitrary, capricious, and abused its discretion 
because the penalties set forth in the Final Order were disproportionate to punitive action taken 
against other licensees were rejected by the District Court (R., p. 593), he then claims that the Board 
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abused its discretion because of the relative quantity of violations that were found, Mr. lanoush's 
previous statements to him, and that it was not a disinterested party because it initiated and 
prosecuted the formal Complaint. (Petitioner's Brief, pp. 36-37.) This is the first time he makes these 
specific allegations. 
As discussed in Section B, the record must reflect an adverse ruling on that issue to be 
considered on appeal. Whitted, 137 Idaho at 122. Although the legal theory was raised below, the 
facts and ideas upon which Williams supports his argument are entirely disparate; the heading is the 
same, but the substance is different. Consequentl y, Williams never raised this particular issue below, 
and the Record does not reflect an adverse ruling on whether the Board abused its discretion on these 
bases. Therefore, the issue is precluded from review. 
However, notwithstanding the different basis before it, the District Court's reasoning was 
sound in finding that the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining the appropriate sanctions 
based on Williams' violations. As noted by the District Court, the decision regarding the imposition 
of disciplinary administrative sanction is within an agency's discretion. BaH) v. Idaho State Bd. of 
Med., 143 Idaho 51, 54 (2006). 
Williams has not demonstrated that the Board was arbitrary, capricious, or abused its 
discretion in determining which sanctions were appropriate given the nature of Williams ' violations. 
First, he focuses on the facial quantity of violations rather than the substantive gravity of the 
violations. The Board determined, and the District Court agreed, that "Williams was found to have 
repeatedly accessed an appraisal web site using other persons' account information without their 
permission, certified that he had personally inspected properties that he had not actually personally 
inspected, and failed to provide relevant and accurate information concerning the sewer service 
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availability in reference to a multi-million dollar multi-use development property sale. Upon these 
facts the Board could reasonably conclude that it was not in the public's interest to allow Williams 
to continue to licensed as a real estate appraiser." (R., pp. 593-594 )(citing to the Board's Final Order, 
R. Agency, Vol. 11., Tab No. 96, pp. 2-3.) 
Second, although Mr. lanoush made comments to Mr. Williams regarding his desire to see 
Williams' license revoked, Williams' has failed to demonstrate how lanoush tainted the Hearing 
Officer or the Board, as discussed above. 
Lastly, Williams alleges that the Board abused its discretion because it could not be a 
disinterested party based on the fact that it procedurally filed the formal Complaint to initiate the 
contested case and referred the case to the Deputy Attorney General for resolution. Specifically, he 
states that "the Board was no doubt swayed by its own allegations, regardless of having prevailed 
upon the same." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 37.) However, the findings regarding the Board's allegations 
were established by an impartial hearing officer. Further, the findings and conclusions ofthe hearing 
officer were adopted in their entirety. (R. Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 96, p. 1.) If the Board was truly 
swayed by "its own" allegations in the Complaint, the Board could have rejected the Hearing 
Officer's findings, many of which, as Williams emphasizes, were in his favor: the Board did not do 
so. 
Ultimately, Williams does not offer any evidence other than these three accusations to 
demonstrate that the Board's consideration of the appropriate sanctions for the established violations 
was biased or outside of the bounds of its discretion. Accordingly, this Court should uphold the 
Board's Final Order because it was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of the Board's discretion. 
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I. The Board's Authority to Recover Costs and Fees is Sufficient to Allow for the 
Recovery of the Attorney Fees it Incurred in the Investigation and Prosecution of 
Williams' Violations of its Laws and Rules. 
The Board cross-appeals the sole issue regarding the Board's statutory authority to recover 
the attorney fees it incurred in the investigation and prosecution of the violations of the Board's law 
and rules. The Board's Final Order stated, "[t]hat pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 54-[4107] and 67-
2609(a)(6) and (7), and IDAPA 24.18.01.525, the Board possesses the authority to impose the 
following disciplinary sanctions upon Respondent Timothy Williams ... [Williams] shall pay to the 
Board the costs and attorney's fees incurred by the Board in the investigation and prosecution of 
Respondent regarding the four violations of the Board's laws and rules as set forth [in the Final 
Order]." (R. Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 96, pp. 2-3.) Subsequently, the Board entered its Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Costs and Fees, in which the Board assessed Williams $34,131.17 of the fees 
and costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of his violations of the Board's laws and 
rules. (R. Agency Cert., Second Supplement to Agency Record on Appeal, Attachment H.) 
1. The Board's Decision to Award Attorney Fees Has a Solid Foundation in the Rules 
and Statutes Governing the Board. 
Pursuant to I.e. § 67-2609(a)(6), the Board promulgated rule IDAPA 24.18.01.525.02, 
which states the Board may "order a licensed or certified real estate appraiser to pay the costs and 
fees incurred by the Board in the investigation and prosecution of a licensee for violation [of its laws 
and rules]." The core of the issue on cross-appeal is whether the Board's express authorization in 
statute and rule to recover "fees" refers to all types of fees. 
In the action below, Williams "[did] not challenge the authority of the Board to investigate 
and prosecute violations of the Act and to recover costs and fees incurred in the investigation and 
prosecution of a licensee" (R., p. 529); however, he disputed that the term "fees" in I.e. § 67-
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2609(a)(6) and IDAPA 24.18.01.525.02 includes attorney fees. His argument was that the term 
included the recovery of some subsets of fees such as witness fees (R., p. 529) but that it excluded 
the recovery of the subset of attorney fees. However, there is no indication that the Legislature meant 
to specifically exclude attorney fees from the types of fees that the Board could recover. 
There is no reason, given the nature of the Board's work and the framework of a licensing 
board's investigation and prosecution of disciplinary actions, that its statutory authority to recover 
fees excludes one type of fee-attorney fees-but includes other types of fees, such as court reporter 
fees, hearing officer fees, witness fees; all of these fees were expended for the same purpose. See 
Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, lO2 Idaho 744, 751-752 (1981) (noting that 
the "statutory framework designed for the peculiar needs and circumstances" of an agency action is 
relevant to consideration of whether statutory authority allows for an award of attorney fees). 
Attorney fees are plainly a common and necessary type of fees that are associated with the 
investigation and prosecution of licensees' violations of a board's law and rules. 
Furthermore, Idaho statutes dealing with awards of attorney fees do not uniformly draw a 
blunt distinction between attorney fees and other types of fees. For example, LC. § 7- 1028 (part of 
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act), is entitled "Costs and Fees," and allows for the payment 
of several types of fees, including filing fees and attorney fees. Additionally, several Idaho statutes 
state that attorney fees are to be taxed as costs, which under the Board's statutes and rules are also 
authorized here. See, e.g., I.e. §§ 7-lO28(2); 54-1929; 7-718 (as interpreted by Ada Co. Highway 
Dist., By and Through Fairbanks v. Acarrequi, lO5 Idaho 873 (1983»; I.e. § 52-411 (holding that 
"attorney fees [] shall be recoverable by plaintiff as part of his costs of the lawsuit"); and] 5-8-208 
("[e]ither the district court or the court on appeal may, in its discretion, order costs, including 
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reasonable attorney fees, to be awarded"). Although, some statutes for governing other agencies in 
Idaho may have language specifically naming attorney fees as authorized in disciplinary proceedings, 
this does not take away the ability of this Board to do so. To so hold would be inconsistent with 
numerous state statutes identified above. 
Moreover, IDAPA 04.11.0l.741, Orders Regarding Costs and/or Fees (Rule 741) is 
instructive here. This IDAPA section, governing the procedures of the Office of the Attorney 
General, is adopted per se by the Board here through IDAPA 04.11.01.001.02 ("every state agency 
will be considered to have adopted the procedural rules of this chapter unless the state agency by rule 
affirmatively declines to adopt this chapter, in whole or in part"); see also IDAPA 23.20.01.003 
(Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses procedural rules, adopting Attorney General procedural 
rules), and IDAPA 24.18.01.650 (Real Estate Appraiser Board adopting procedural rules of the Idaho 
Bureau of Occupational Licenses). IDAPA 04.11.0 l.741.0 1 specifically states: "This rule provides 
procedures for considering requests for costs and/or fees (including attorney fees) when an agency 
has authority to award costs and/or fees under other provisions of law." As such, the very procedural 
rules that govern the Board state that a provision of law that grants an administrative agency the 
authority to award costs and fees includes a right to award attorney fees. 
The District Court erred in determining that the Board's statutory authorization to recover 
fees was insufficient to award attorney fees. It referenced Willimns v. State for the proposition that 
the term fees was inadequate to provide due process notice that attorney fees are a type of fee that 
may be assessed. (R., p. 594.) However, Williams is inapposite because in that case the Court of 
Appeals found that a statute was not void for vagueness because when construed with other statutes 
related to Commercial Driver's Licenses (CDL), the statute provided sufficient notice that an 
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individual's CDL was subject to revocation for violation of a criminal statute. 153 Idaho 380, 238 
P.3d 127, 136-137 (Ct. App. 2012). This was not a case where the court found that a broader 
statutory term was found to exclude a subset within the term. 
Additionally, Williams actually supports the position, noted above, that when taking together 
all the statutes and rules that apply to the licensing of real estate appraisers, including I.C § 67-
2609(a)(6), IDAPA 24.18.01.525.02, IDAPA 23.20.01.003, IDAPA 24.18.01.650, and IDAPA 
04.11.01. 741.01, a licensee has notice that the Board has the authority to recover fees and that the 
term specifically contemplates the inclusion of attorney fees. See id. at 137. Hence, a licensee has 
notice that attorney fees are recoverable. 
The District Court also looked to Idaho PO'vver, quoting, in part, "that attorney fees may be 
awarded only where specifically provided in statute or contract." (R., p. 595.) However, in that case 
this court was applying a "general rule" to a situation where the Public Utilities Commission 
imposed attorney fees solely based on its broad grants of authority to "supervise and regulate" public 
utilities and to adopt rules or practice and procedure for its hearings. Idaho Power, 102 Idaho at 750. 
The Commission's statutes and rules nowhere mentioned the awarding of fees. Id. Lastly, the 
District Court drew from State v. Rae emphasizing the Court of Appeal's use of the word "explicit" 
in its holding that attorney fees must stem from a statutory basis. 139 Idaho 650, 656 (Ct. App. 
2004). There, a criminal defendant had not directed the court to any statutory basis for an award of 
costs or attorney fees. Id. 
Ultimately, the cases used for support by the District Court are all cases in which there was 
no statutory authority for any award of any kinds of fees. However, in this case the statutes and rules 
governing the Board specifically authorize the Board to recover its fees. Thus, in the present case, 
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there is a solid foundation for the recovery of all types of fees, including attorney fees. In short, the 
plain language of the statutes and rules and statutory framework of the administrative licensing 
disciplinary proceedings demonstrate that the term fees is inclusive of all fees incurred in the 
investigation and prosecution of a licensee's violations of the Board's laws and rules. 
2. The Board's Determination of the Costs and Fees Ordered Was Not an Abuse 
of Discretion. 
In the present case, the Board used the guiding principles of the case Haw v. Idaho State 
Board of Medicine, 143 Idaho 5] (2006) in determining how to award fees and costs in this case. 
In Haw, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the Board of Medicine's award of attorney fees against 
a licensee in a disciplinary case. The Board in that case had granted itself a full attorney fee award 
despite the fact that very few of the original charges against the licensee had ultimately been found 
to be valid, declining the licensee's request to apportion the attorney fee award based on the number 
of charges found to be valid. On judicial review, the district court vacated this award, finding that 
although "the numerical count of claims won or lost was not dispositive, [it] concluded the record 
clearly showed the Board prevailed in part and lost in part. As the hoard engaged in no analysis 
regarding the relative significance of the claims won or lost, the District Court concluded the board 
failed to establish its entitlement to costs and attorney fees." 143 Idaho at 53. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, that court determined that an administrative board "must 
engage in a meaningful analysis of the charges made in relation to the charges upon which the board 
was successful. While the board need not add up the allegations and calculate with mathematical 
precision who won the most claims, there should be some analysis of precisely how much time and 
effort went into proving the misconduct that resulted in discipline." 143 Idaho at 54. The Idaho 
Supreme Court then directed that "the Board should consider how many of the claims the doctor 
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prevailed on, the overall success in supporting the Board's allegations and the amount of time and 
effort devoted to proving the claimed misconduct for which discipline was imposed, as opposed to 
the total time spent in pursuing all of the allegations." Id. 
In the present case, the Board did just as the Haw court directed. It did not award itself a total 
amount of fees and costs. Rather, it conducted a meaningful analysis of those claims upon which the 
Board prevailed and those upon which Williams prevailed. Pages 7-11 of the Board's Memorandum 
Decision Order on Costs and Fees are dedicated to the Board's analysis of these very issues. (R. 
Agency Cert., Second Supplement, Attachment H.) The Board plainly looked at the total number of 
counts initially brought against Williams and how those counts ultimately stood. Further, the Board 
derived specific formulas for dealing with each count in considering the number of claims the Board 
had prevailed on within that count. Id. at 9. More so, the Board's analysis of these factors extended 
not just to attorney fees, but to specific costs as well, including the nature of individual costs and 
how they applied specifically to the counts brought against Williams. Id. at 9-10. 
Importantly, in reaching its decision on attorney fees and costs, the Board considered the fact 
that it had imposed significant discipline upon Mr. Williams-revocation of his license-due to the 
serious nature of the claims upon which the Board had prevailed. The Board specifically found 
deliberate and substantial misrepresentations and dishonesty by Williams in Count I that alone 
justified revocation of his license. See id., p. 8. This fact by itself is significant given Haw's directive 
that "the sanction bear[] a reasonable relationship to the conduct warranting discipline." 143 Idaho 
at 55 (compare to the facts in Haw, in which the board's numerous allegations of misconduct were 
largely insignificant, such as illegible handwriting, incomplete and stereotypical charting, etc.). 
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The Board has complied with the directions in Haw and the apportionment of fees and costs 
is not an abuse of discretion.2 Here, the Board perceived that its decision with respect to fees and 
costs was discretionary (see R. Agency Cert., Second Supplement, Attachment H, p. 4) 
(acknowledging that the Board's decision was being made pursuant to its discretionary authority). 
The Board acted within the outer limits of its discretion and consistent with legal standards 
applicable to the available choices, as demonstrated above. And, the Board undertook an exercise 
ofreason in reaching its decision, as evidenced by the analysis in the Memorandum Decision itself. 
Thus, this Court should uphold the Memorandum Decision and Order on Costs and Fees. Finally, 
the Board, as Cross-Appellant, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(c) reserves it right to file a reply 
brief to Williams' cross-respondent brief on this issue. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should affirm the District Court's decision and 
uphold the Final Order as to all issues on direct appeal and should reverse the District Court's 
decision regarding the Board's recovery of its attorney fees on cross-appeal. Appellant has failed to 
set forth any meritorious argument as to why the Board's Final Order was in error or should be 
reversed. Also, the Memorandum and Decision Order on Costs and Fees should be upheld because 
2 The Haw court established: 
While this Court has been confronted with the question of whether a certain agency 
action constitutes an abuse of discretion, we have not expressly articulated the 
standard to be applied when making that determination. We now clarify that an 
appellate court reviewing agency actions under the APA must determine whether the 
agency perceived the issue in question as discretionary, acted within the outer limits 
of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the available 
choices, and reached its own decision through an exercise of reason. 143 Idaho at 54. 
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the Board had the authority to recover its fees and did not abuse its discretion in determining the 
award. Further, this Court should award the Respondent-Cross-Appellant Board its attorney fees and 
costs on appeal under I.e. § 12-117 where the Appellant's arguments have no valid basis in law or 
fact, in whole or in part. 
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